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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Amicus Curiae Jorge L. Contreras, a Presidential Scholar and Professor of 
Law at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, is an internationally-
recognized expert on the legal aspects of technical standardization, including 
intellectual property and antitrust issues. He has edited five books and published 
more than fifty law review articles and book chapters on these topics and has won 
numerous awards for his scholarship and teaching, including the IEEE Standards 
Association’s 2018 Standards Education Award and first prize in the Standards 
Engineering Society (SES) 2011 and 2015 paper competitions. 
Professor Contreras is licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia 
and has represented a number of standards development organizations (SDOs) and 
companies involved in standardization. Among these, he served for twenty years as 
the principal legal counsel for the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the 
primary SDO responsible for standards relating to the Internet. He has also 
authored or co-authored numerous research studies on standards and 
standardization, including for the National Academies of Science, the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the European Commission. 
He holds a B.S.E.E. degree in electrical and computer engineering from Rice 
University and is a Senior Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers. His J.D. from Harvard Law School was also conferred cum laude.  
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2 
Professor Contreras has no personal interest in the outcome of this case but 
has a professional interest in seeing that this case, which has provoked heavy 
lobbying and controversy, is decided in accordance with longstanding and well-
settled principles of law and with a full understanding of the historical context of 
industry standard-setting. 
RELEVANCE OF PROFESSOR CONTRERAS’S AMICUS BRIEF 
This brief is filed on behalf of Professor Contreras and not on behalf of his 
academic institution. Professor Contreras does not represent any of the parties and 
has no vested interest in the outcome of this litigation. He writes in support of the 
FTC and affirmance of the district court’s decision. As noted below, Professor 
Contreras takes issue with arguments raised by Qualcomm, the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”), the Department of Defense (“DOD”), and the Department of 
Energy (“DOE”). In Professor Contreras’ view, the arguments raised by Qualcomm 
and these federal agencies mischaracterize the import of the district court’s ruling 
and the applicable legal standards. 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP AND CONSENT 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(E), amicus curiae 
Jorge L. Contreras certifies that no party or party’s counsel authored this brief in 
whole or in part, no party or party’s counsel contributed money that was intended 
to fund preparing or submitting this brief, and no person or entity—other than 
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3 
amicus curiae or his counsel—authored the brief or made a monetary contribution 
to the preparation or submission of this brief. 
Appellant Qualcomm Incorporated (“Qualcomm” or “Appellant”) and 
Appellee Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Appellee”) have consented to the 
filing of Professor Contreras’s amicus brief. On November 19, 2019 Tom 
Goldstein, counsel for Qualcomm, stated that Qualcomm consents to Professor 
Contreras’s participation as amicus. Counsel also contacted Michele Arington, 
counsel for the FTC. On November 20, 2019, Ms. Arington stated that the FTC 
consents to Professor Contreras’s amicus filing.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Technical interoperability standards connect billions of devices around the 
world in a manner that is largely invisible to the consumer. The effectiveness and 
global reach of such standards derives in large part from the fact that they are 
developed collaboratively within international standards development 
organizations (SDOs) that are open to all participants and that make the resulting 
standards publicly accessible.  
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4 
Standards are often covered by patents held by the firms that participated in 
their development.1 In order to encourage the broad adoption of standards and to 
prevent patent owners from “blocking implementation of a given standard,” 
ER252, many SDOs require their participants to license any patents that are 
essential to the implementation of the SDO’s standards (known as standards-
essential patents or SEPs) to anyone wishing to incorporate the standard into a 
product. U.S. Dept. Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and 
Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition 45-48 (2007). 
Some SDOs require that those licenses be granted on a royalty-free basis (e.g., the 
SDOs responsible for Bluetooth, USB and most Internet standards), but other 
SDOs (e.g., the SDOs responsible for Wi-Fi and wireless telecommunications 
standards) permit patent holders to charge product manufacturers a royalty that is 
“reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (RAND) or “fair, reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory” (FRAND).2 Justus Baron & Daniel F. Spulber, Technology 
Standards and Standard Setting Organizations: Introduction to the Searle Center 
Database, 27 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 462, 479, tbl. 4 (2018). 
                                      
1 See, e.g., Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to Patents Using 
Declarations Standard-Essential Patents, 27 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 504, 521, 
tbl. 7 (2018) (the 4G LTE standard is covered by 45,279 patents; the 3G UMTS 
standard is covered by 39,748 patents). 
2 Courts have generally treated the terms RAND and FRAND as synonymous. For 
consistency with the briefing and opinions in this case, this brief uses the term 
FRAND. 
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5 
As described by the district court, Qualcomm participated in the 
development of 3G and 4G wireless telecommunication standards under the 
auspices of two SDOs, the Telecommunications Industry Association (“TIA”) and 
the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (“ATIS”). ER253. Each of 
these SDOs had adopted intellectual property rights policies (IPR Policies) that 
required their participants to grant licenses of SEPs to implementers of their 
standards on FRAND terms. Yet, over the course of several years, Qualcomm 
refused to license its SEPs to numerous actual and potential modem chip rivals 
including MediaTek, Project Dragonfly (a joint venture of NTT DoCoMo, 
Samsung and several Japanese manufacturers), Samsung, VIA Telecom, Intel, 
HiSilicon (a subsidiary of Huawei), Broadcom, Texas Instruments, and LGE. 
ER1280-90. The district court also found that when Qualcomm did license its SEPs 
to smartphone vendors, its royalty rates were “unreasonably high.” ER1211. 
Accordingly, the district court found that Qualcomm violated its FRAND 
commitments to ATIS and TIA, as well as Sections 1 , and Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 , and Section 5 
of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). ER1381-82. As a remedy, the district court 
entered an injunction that, inter alia, required Qualcomm to license its SEPs on 
FRAND terms to rival chip makers, and to renegotiate its existing SEP licenses to 
reflect reasonable royalty rates. ER1391, ER1393-95. Qualcomm now appeals. 
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6 
This brief seeks to draw to the Court’s attention historical, practical and 
policy matters pertaining to technical standardization that bear on the arguments 
made on appeal by Qualcomm and its federal agency amici curiae. In particular, 
this brief argues that: (1) the district court was correct to conclude that Qualcomm 
is required to license its SEPs to all applicants on FRAND terms, (2) the 
“reasonable” royalty level required by Qualcomm’s commitments to the relevant 
SDOs should not be measured by Qualcomm’s own royalties charged to others, 
and (3) enforcement of the district court’s injunction against Qualcomm will not 
threaten U.S. national security, and the arguments made to that effect 
mischaracterize or misunderstand the nature of both patent law and standards.  
Qualcomm has undeniably played a significant role in the development of 
wireless telecommunications technology. However, the antitrust laws must be 
enforced rigorously and even-handedly to eliminate anticompetitive conduct. An 
enterprise that has engaged in anticompetitive conduct should not be excused 
simply because it contributes to the national economy or to national infrastructure 
or defense. Giving Qualcomm special treatment in this case would open the door to 
such arguments in practically every antitrust case involving major industrial or 
technology players. And, as such, the force of the antitrust laws would be severely 
weakened to the detriment of American competition and consumers. Accordingly, 
this brief urges the Court to affirm the decision and order of the district court. 
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I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
QUALCOMM WAS REQUIRED TO LICENSE ITS SEPS TO ALL 
APPLICANTS 
The district court found that Qualcomm was required to license its SEPs on 
FRAND terms to rival modem chip suppliers pursuant to the IPR Policies of ATIS 
and TIA, ER1395, and that Qualcomm’s refusal to grant such licenses was 
evidence that it violated the antitrust laws. Id. In its Opening Brief, Qualcomm 
challenges both of these conclusions, arguing that, at a minimum, there is a 
material question of fact as to the meaning of the ATIS and TIA policies which 
precludes summary judgment. This section draws the Court’s attention to historical 
and other factors supporting the district court’s interpretation of the ATIS and TIA 
Policies, which require Qualcomm to license its SEPs to “all applicants,” including 
rival modem chip suppliers.  
A. FRAND Commitments Have Their Origins in Remedial Patent 
Access Requirements 
Commitments to license patents on FRAND terms first appeared during 
World War II in remedial orders intended to address anticompetitive arrangements 
involving patents. Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing 
Current Debates in Standard-Setting and Antitrust through a Historical Lens, 80 
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Antitrust L.J. 39, 49-51 (2015).3 In more than one hundred of these orders entered 
from the 1940s through the 1970s, the patent holder was required to grant licenses 
(on a paid or a royalty-free basis) to “all applicants.” Id. at 41, 74. The purpose of 
this requirement was to remove barriers that the patent holder had improperly 
imposed on competition, thereby making the patented technology available to all 
who wished to use it. See id. at 74. Thus, in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 
323 U.S. 386, modified by 324 U.S. 570 (1945), the Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court’s order that each defendant patent holder grant to any applicant a 
license to make, have made, use and/or sell any patented machine at “a reasonable 
royalty.” 323 U.S. at 413.  
B. SDO-Based FRAND Commitments are Widely Understood to be 
Universal Access Requirements 
Like their historical antecedents, voluntary SDO-based FRAND 
commitments are mechanisms for ensuring broad access to patented technologies. 
In the early twentieth century, there was a general discomfort with including 
patented technologies in industry standards. The American Standards Association 
(ASA) adopted its first policy relating to patents in 1932, stating that “as a general 
                                      
3 Unlike today’s FRAND commitments, which are made voluntarily by SEP 
holders, these early FRAND commitments were largely imposed on patent holders 
as remedies for antitrust law violations. Nevertheless, it is informative to consider 
these early remedial FRAND orders, as the language of the FRAND commitments 
themselves is remarkably similar to today’s SDO-based FRAND commitments and 
both serve a market-opening function. 
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proposition patented designs or methods should not be incorporated in standards,” 
unless the patentee was “willing to grant such rights as will avoid monopolistic 
tendencies.” Contreras, FRAND History, supra at 43, n.17.  
By 1959, ASA updated its policy to provide that “[s]tandards should not 
include items whose production is covered by patents unless the patent holder 
agrees to and does make available to any interested and qualified party a license on 
reasonable terms….” Id. at 43 (emphasis added). And by 1969 the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the successor to ASA, provided that if a 
patent covers any portion of a proposed American National Standard, the relevant 
SDO must obtain an assurance from the patent holder that a license will be made 
available to applicants under reasonable terms and conditions “that are 
demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.” Id. at 44, n. 26. Through all of 
these stages of development, it is clear that the FRAND commitment is intended to 
ensure broad access to patented technologies included in industry standards. 
When considering the FRAND commitment imposed by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), this Court previously reasoned that the SEP 
holder promised to “grant a license to an unrestricted number of applicants on a 
worldwide, non-discriminatory basis,” and that such language “admits of no 
limitations as to who or how many applicants could receive a license.” Microsoft 
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Microsoft 
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II]. Three years later, this Court reiterated this principle, holding that under the ITU 
Policy, a “SEP holder cannot refuse a license to a manufacturer who commits to 
paying the [F]RAND rate.” Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 
(9th Cir. 2015) [Microsoft III]. Thus, the access enabling function of FRAND 
commitments has been widely recognized, including by this Court. 
C. The Unambiguous Language of the ATIS and TIA Policies 
Requires Participants to License SEPs to All Applicants 
The language of the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies to which Qualcomm agreed 
to abide clearly follows the historical treatment of FRAND commitments as access 
requirements. The TIA IPR Policy states that “[a] license under any Essential 
Patent(s), the license rights which are held by the undersigned Patent Holder, will 
be made available to all applicants under terms and conditions that are reasonable 
and non-discriminatory.”  ER252 (emphasis added). And the ATIS Policy simply 
mirrors the ANSI policy discussed above, requiring that “applicants”, without 
limitation, have access to licenses from SEP holders. ER253. As a result, the TIA 
and ATIS policies must be understood as requiring SEP holders to grant licenses on 
FRAND terms to all applicants. As such, Qualcomm’s refusal to license its SEPs to 
modem chip suppliers violates these policies.4 
                                      
4 As pointed out by the District Court, Qualcomm itself has viewed SDO FRAND 
commitments as requiring licensing to all applicants in contexts outside the present 
litigation. ER1291-94. 
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D. Qualcomm Cannot Comply with its FRAND Commitments by 
Unilaterally Refraining from Asserting its SEPs against 
Applicants for Licenses 
Qualcomm argues in its Opening Brief that it cannot be deemed to have 
violated its FRAND commitments because “it does not assert its SEPs against 
modem chipmakers.” Opening Brief for Appellant Qualcomm at 146, FTC v. 
Qualcomm Inc., No. 19-16122 (9th Cir., Aug. 23, 2019), ECF No. 80. In other 
words, because Qualcomm does not enforce its SEPs against chip makers, it should 
be deemed to have complied with its obligation to grant them a license to its 
patented technology. Or, in other words, by licensing its SEPs to end product 
(smartphone) manufacturers, Qualcomm effectively gives the suppliers of the chips 
included in those end products access to its SEPs. Qualcomm Opening Br. at 44-45 
(“because Qualcomm enforces its SEPs at the OEM level, its chip rivals have 
access to Qualcomm’s standardized technology”).  
But as Qualcomm points out elsewhere, there is a clear legal difference 
between granting a license to an applicant, and simply ignoring that applicant’s 
request for a license. Namely, the recipient of a license has a legal immunity from 
suit, whereas the ignored applicant continues to infringe Qualcomm’s patents and 
runs a continual risk that Qualcomm might – as it has done in the past5 – sue for 
                                      
5 For example, Qualcomm filed various actions against its then-rival Broadcom in 
the mid-2000s, including claims for infringement based on SEPs relating to 
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infringement. That is, with no license from Qualcomm, the suppliers of chips that 
embody Qualcomm’s patented technology remain vulnerable to suit, subject only 
to Qualcomm’s unilateral discretion not to sue them. This places chip suppliers in a 
significantly compromised position and, as the district court noted, “has promoted 
rivals’ exit from the market, prevented rivals’ entry, and delayed or hampered the 
entry and success of other rivals.” ER1280. It is simply not the case that 
Qualcomm’s unilateral decision not to assert patents against an applicant is 
equivalent to granting that applicant a license. 
E. Modem Chip Suppliers “Implement” Wireless 
Telecommunications Standards and are Thus Entitled to Receive 
FRAND Licenses from Qualcomm 
Qualcomm further argues that, even if the ATIS and TIA policies require 
Qualcomm to grant SEP licenses to all applicants, that requirement is limited to 
applicants that “implement” or “practice” the relevant standards. Qualcomm 
Opening Br. at 133. Modem chip suppliers, Qualcomm argues, cannot implement 
or practice standards for wireless telecommunications: “only a complete cellular 
device (such as a phone or tablet) or cellular infrastructure (such as a base station) 
can implement or practice such standards.” Id. As a result, Qualcomm argues that it 
                                      
3GPP’s cellular GSM standard, see First Amended Complaint, Qualcomm Inc. v. 
Broadcom Corp., No. 05-cv-1392 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2006), ECF No. 43, and to the 
ITU’s H.264 standard; and Complaint, Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 
3:05-cv-1958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2005), ECF No. 1. 
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has no obligation to grant SEP licenses to rival chip suppliers.  
But in today’s world of miniaturized, plug-and-play components, the 
technical protocols that power interoperability standards are, by and large, 
embodied in chips. A smartphone manufacturer must purchase chips for all of the 
major interfaces in a phone – Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, GPS, camera, audio, and memory, 
as well as wireless telecommunications. See Martin Sauter, From GSM to LTE-
Advanced Pro and 5G: An Introduction to Mobile Networks and Mobile 
Broadband 61 (3d ed. 2017). While the chips themselves do not enable all of the 
functionality specified by the standard (e.g., one does not actually speak into a 
modem chip to make a phone call), these highly complex chips do embody the 
principal technical features of the standard.6 
The Supreme Court has long held that the sale of an article that partially 
embodies a patent is sufficient to exhaust the patent if the “only and intended use” 
of the article is for it to be used in a manner that infringes the patent. United States 
v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 250-51 (1942) (sale of lens blanks exhausted 
patents in finished lenses); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 
617, 628 (2008) (patent is exhausted “when the item sufficiently embodies the 
                                      
6 Moreover, it is not clear that a smartphone implements the entirety of the relevant 
standards either, as Qualcomm seems to argue, given that some functionality 
described in those standards is implemented in base stations and other central 
facilities. 
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patent—even if it does not completely practice the patent—such that its only and 
intended use is to be finished under the terms of the patent.”). Thus, in Quanta, the 
Court held that LG’s licensing of a patent to Intel for purposes of making a 
computer chip exhausted LG’s patent covering the chip’s operation in a computer, 
even though Intel did not manufacture or sell routine computer components such as 
memory and buses along with the chips. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 630-34. As observed 
by the Court, “[e]verything inventive about each patent” was embodied in the chip, 
and as such LG’s initial license to Intel exhausted the patent. Id. at 633. 
The situation in this case is analogous to the one in Quanta. Qualcomm’s 
SEPs cover key aspects of 3G/4G wireless telecommunications standards. Those 
standards are embodied in modem chips manufactured by Qualcomm. In many 
cases, these chips embody “everything inventive about each patent” (i.e., the 
protocols and technology necessary to connect to and communicate via a wireless 
cellular network). While the smartphone manufacturer that buys these chips 
connects them to routine components such as a power supply and buses, the 
addition of these elements would not serve to insulate the patents covering the 
chips from exhaustion. Likewise, the attachment of these routine components to a 
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modem chip should not be deemed necessary to “implement” or “practice” the 
wireless telecommunications standard embodied in the chip.7  
As such, Qualcomm should not be excused from its commitment to license 
its SEPs to modem chip suppliers simply because they do not provide all of the 
standard elements of a smartphone. Just as the Univis lens blanks embodied the 
patented technology in finished lenses, and Intel’s computer chips embodied the 
patented technology in a computer system, the relevant TIA and ATIS wireless 
telecommunications standards are embodied in Qualcomm’s modem chips. 
II. QUALCOMM’S DESIRE TO USE ITS OWN ROYALTY RATES TO 
DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF A “REASONABLE” ROYALTY IS 
AN EXERCISE IN CIRCULAR REASONING 
The district court found that Qualcomm’s royalty rates for SEPs were 
“unreasonably high,” putting it in breach of its FRAND commitments and 
constituting evidence that it violated the Sherman Act. ER1323. In its Opening 
Brief, Qualcomm argues that the district court erred by failing to assess the 
reasonableness of Qualcomm’s royalty rates using the “best measure” for a 
reasonable royalty: “Qualcomm’s previously established royalty for the same 
portfolio.” Qualcomm Opening Br. at 86. That is, though the district court found 
that Qualcomm had monopoly power in the modem chip market beginning in 
                                      
7 Qualcomm acknowledges that its patents would likely be exhausted if it granted 
licenses to chip makers. Qualcomm Opening Br. at 45. 
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2006, Qualcomm’s royalty rate for its patent portfolio remained relatively constant 
both before and after that date, “demonstrating that those royalties were not the 
result of Qualcomm supposedly leveraging its monopoly power in the relevant chip 
markets.” Id. at 86-87. Qualcomm then cites a line of patent damages cases holding 
that an “established royalty” is “the best measure” of value in a reasonable royalty 
calculation. Id. at 86 (citing, inter alia, Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 638 (9th 
Cir. 1952) and Georgia-Pacific v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). In effect, Qualcomm argues that its royalty during the 
period of monopolization should be compared with its royalty prior to 
monopolization and, because they are similar, its royalty during the period of 
monopolization should be deemed “reasonable.”  
Even if one accepts Qualcomm’s premise that a damages-based “reasonable 
royalty” analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) is appropriate to determine whether 
a SEP royalty satisfies the patent holder’s FRAND commitment, using the patent 
holder’s own prior royalties as a benchmark is problematic. As explained by Cotter 
et al., the use of prior licenses as “comparables” when determining a reasonable 
royalty can result in a significant “circularity” problem. That is, “if the prior 
licenses being used as comparables were negotiated in circumstances where the 
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licensee was subject to holdup8 … the comparable will reflect holdup … value, not 
just the value of the patented technology.” Thomas F. Cotter et al., Reasonable 
Royalties, in Patent Remedies and Complex Products: Toward a Global Consensus 
36 (C. Bradford Biddle et al. eds., 2019). 
This issue was recognized by the Supreme Court as early as 1945. In 
Hartford-Empire, the Supreme Court reviewed a remedial order requiring the 
defendant patent holders to license their patents to all applicants at “standard 
royalties.” The Court held that the term “standard royalties” should be changed to 
“uniform reasonable royalties” in order to “avoid any misunderstanding” that the 
patent holders’ “present royalties are reasonable.” 324 U.S. at 574. 
In this case, the district court found that Qualcomm’s royalties were 
“unreasonably high” and that Qualcomm maintained these unreasonable royalty 
levels despite changes to Qualcomm’s patent portfolio and the underlying 
standards. ER1323-59.9 While the FTC’s antitrust case against Qualcomm focused 
                                      
8 The term holdup is used frequently in cases involving technical standards. See, 
e.g., Microsoft III, 795 F.3d at 1031 (“The tactic of withholding a license unless 
and until a manufacturer agrees to pay an unduly high royalty rate for an SEP is 
referred to as ‘hold-up.’”); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys. Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (holdup occurs “when the holder of a SEP demands excessive 
royalties after companies are locked into using a standard.”). See generally, Jorge 
L. Contreras, Much Ado about Hold-Up, 2019 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 875 (2019). 
9 The district court did not calculate the precise FRAND royalty that Qualcomm 
should have charged to any given implementer of the 3G/4G standards. For 
purposes of the district court’s antitrust analysis, it was sufficient to determine that 
Qualcomm’s royalties, based on the evidence, were “unreasonably high.”  
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on the time period beginning in 2006, there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
Qualcomm’s pre-2006 royalties were reasonable. Moreover, the district court notes 
that Qualcomm’s share of the SEPs embodied in relevant standards has steadily 
declined over time, that its modem chips no longer drive the value of cellular 
handsets, and that its royalty rates remain higher than those of any other SEP 
holder. ER1323. These facts alone tend to refute the use of Qualcomm’s pre-2006 
royalty rates when assessing the reasonableness of its post-2006 royalty rates. 
More importantly, Qualcomm seems to argue that the FTC’s failure to assert 
that Qualcomm’s pre-2006 conduct violated the antitrust laws implies that 
Qualcomm’s pre-2006 royalties were reasonable. Yet there need not be an antitrust 
law violation in order for a royalty to exceed the reasonable level mandated by the 
patent holder’s FRAND commitment. While the violation of antitrust law is 
certainly an indication that a patent holder is not charging a reasonable royalty as 
required by its FRAND commitment, overcharges can and do occur absent any 
violation of antitrust law. In fact, in prior cases in which FRAND royalty rates have 
been assessed by U.S. courts, no antitrust violation was found notwithstanding 
massive royalty overcharges. See, e.g., Microsoft III; In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 
LLC Patent Litigation, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 
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Accordingly, Qualcomm’s argument that its challenged royalty rates be 
measured for reasonableness against its pre-2006 royalty rates falls into the 
circularity flaw identified by Cotter et al., as there is no evidence demonstrating 
that those pre-2006 royalties were not themselves unreasonable at the time they 
were imposed. 
III. QUALCOMM’S ARGUMENT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT’S 
REMEDIAL ORDER COULD THREATEN U.S. NATIONAL 
SECURITY MISCHARACTERIZES BOTH PATENT LAW AND 
STANDARDS IN THE MARKET 
Qualcomm argues that the remedial order imposed by the district court could 
threaten national security. Qualcomm Opening Br. at 123. In particular, Qualcomm 
raises concerns regarding the district court’s injunction requiring that Qualcomm 
license rival modem chip suppliers, and that Qualcomm negotiate or renegotiate its 
licenses with licensed device manufacturers on terms that are reasonable. Such 
remedies, Qualcomm argues, could reduce Qualcomm’s ability to invest in the 
development of 5G technologies that are critical to U.S. infrastructure and national 
security. Id. at 123-25. 
                                      
10 In Microsoft III, the SEP holder’s royalty demand was approximately 2,000 
times higher than the FRAND rate determined by the court. See Contreras, Hold-
Up, supra, at 889. In Innovatio, the royalty demand was in some cases more than 
300 times higher than the court-determined FRAND rate. Id. 
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The U.S. Department of Justice, in an amicus brief filed in this case, echoes 
these concerns, arguing that “diminishment of Qualcomm’s competitiveness in 5G 
innovation and standard-setting could harm U.S. national security.” Brief for 
Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 32, FTC v. 
Qualcomm Inc., No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), ECF No. 86. The U.S. 
Departments of Defense and Energy filed statements in an earlier stay proceeding 
in this Court, making similar arguments. ER319 ⁋ 3; ER315-16 ⁋ 8-9. In its amicus 
brief before this Court, the DOJ asks the Court to take judicial notice of the DOD 
and DOE positions. DOJ Amicus Br. at 3, n. 1. 
Yet neither Qualcomm nor the federal agencies supporting it have explained 
precisely how the district court’s injunction would threaten national security. 
Indeed, one court has held exactly the opposite.11 This section explains how these 
concerns are misplaced and reflect a misunderstanding of the role and function of 
patents and standards in the market.   
A. Curtailing a Monopolist’s Illegal Practices Should Never Be 
Viewed as Detrimental to the Public Interest 
Throughout the history of the antitrust laws, serious remedies have been 
                                      
11 Initial Determination at *108, In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices and Radio 
Frequency and Processing Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-1065, 
2018 WL 6011829 (Sept. 28, 2018) (finding “a real and palpable likelihood the 
National Security interests will be jeopardized” by Qualcomm’s exclusionary 
conduct), rev’d and modified on other grounds, Commission Opinion, 2019 WL 
2635510 (Apr. 5, 2019). 
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levied against corporate enterprises that have engaged in anticompetitive conduct, 
even when those enterprises have been at the heart of industries critical to the 
national infrastructure security. Prominent historical examples have included major 
antitrust enforcement actions and remedies against large players in the domestic 
steel, aluminum, oil, lighting, chemical and aviation industries – all of which were, 
and continue to be, critical to the national interest. See generally Tim Wu, The 
Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (2018); Contreras, FRAND 
History, supra, at 49-71. More recently, significant structural remedies have been 
levied against AT&T and Microsoft, major architects of the U.S. technology 
infrastructure. Wu, supra, at 93-100; Contreras, FRAND History, supra, at 64-66. 
In none of these cases did national security concerns soften the remedial measures 
imposed to address these companies’ anticompetitive conduct. 
It is undisputed that Qualcomm has made significant contributions to 
wireless telecommunications technology. But can it truly be said that Qualcomm is 
more vital to the national interest today than U.S. Steel, Alcoa, Standard Oil, 
General Electric, AT&T or Microsoft were in their day? Such an assertion would 
be absurd, no matter how integral Qualcomm may claim to be to the development 
of 5G and other mobile wireless technologies.  
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B. Firms That Do Not Emulate Qualcomm’s Anticompetitive 
Business Practices Are Still Profitable and Able to Make Large 
Investments in R&D and Standardization 
It is possible that Qualcomm will become less profitable once it is required 
to comply with the district court’s injunction barring that conduct found by the 
court to be anticompetitive. Yet this is not to say that Qualcomm will not continue 
to be a profitable firm. In fact, there are many firms in the semiconductor industry 
that have not engaged in the kinds of anticompetitive business practices that 
Qualcomm has been found to violate, but which are profitable nonetheless.12 
Moreover, these firms also engage in significant R&D activity,13 including 
                                      
12 For example, based on publicly-reported 2018 financial information, Intel 
achieved a profit margin of approximately 62% on net revenue of $70.8 billion, 
and Broadcom achieved a profit margin of approximately 52% on net revenue of 
$20.8 billion. 2018 Intel Corporation Form 10-K, at 20-21, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086319000007/a12292018
q4-10kdocument.htm; 2018 Broadcom Inc. Form 10-K, at 33, 43, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1730168/000173016818000084/avgo-
11042018x10k.htm. Qualcomm, by comparison, reported a profit margin of 55% 
on revenue of $22.7 billion. 2018 QUALCOMM Incorporated Form 10-K, at 41, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/804328/000172894918000095/qcom10-
k2018.htm. 
13 In 2018, Intel invested $13.5 billion in R&D (19% of revenue) and Broadcom 
invested $3.7 billion in R&D (18% of revenue). 2018 Intel Corporation Form 10-
K, at 22;2018 Broadcom Inc. Form 10-K, at 43. Qualcomm, by comparison, 
invested $5.6 billion in R&D (25% of revenue). 2018 QUALCOMM Incorporated 
Form 10-K, at 53.  
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participation in, and leadership of, numerous standards development 
organizations.14  
Accordingly, while Qualcomm may be less profitable after complying with 
the district court’s injunction, it may still be a profitable firm, and can, as dictated 
by competitive pressures in the semiconductor industry, continue to make 
significant investments in R&D. Thus, the assertion that enforcement of the district 
court’s injunction will lead to a drastic reduction in, or elimination of, Qualcomm’s 
R&D expenditures, appears to be significantly overstated. Qualcomm will still 
have every incentive to build next generation chips for its customers, and to invest 
in future products and technologies. 
C. Qualcomm’s Compliance with the District Court’s Injunction 
Will not Impair its Ability to Supply Products to U.S. 
Government Agencies 
Both the DOD and DOE express concern that the district court’s injunction 
will impair or eliminate Qualcomm’s ability to supply 5G mobile chips for use in 
critical governmental applications such as secure wireless sensors for nuclear 
control and emergency communications systems, ER316-17 ¶ 10, and military 
communications channels, ER321-22 ⁋ 9. The DOE further explains that “[i]f 
                                      
14 By way of example, through 2013, Intel was a member of 100 different SDOs 
(more than any company other than IBM). Baron & Spulber, supra, at 485, tbl. 5. 
Broadcom was a member of 52 SDOs, and Qualcomm was a member of 53 SDOs. 
Id. 
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Qualcomm is not able to compete and provide chipsets for those [applications] … 
foreign entities that may not support supply chain secure solutions may make 
irreversible gains in the chipset market and 5G standards.” ER316 ¶ 9. 
Thus, these agencies equate Qualcomm’s reduced profits flowing from the 
district court’s injunction with an inability to supply components for critical 
national infrastructure and security applications. These concerns are misplaced, 
however, as they are based on an inaccurate understanding of the nature of 
technical standardization and patents covering standardized technologies. 
1. The District Court’s Injunction Will Not Eliminate 
Qualcomm’s Ability to Develop, Manufacture and Sell 
Modem Chips to Government Agencies 
The district court’s injunction requires Qualcomm, among other things, to 
grant SEP licenses to rival modem chip suppliers (a practice that Qualcomm 
engaged in until it realized that licensing only to device manufacturers was 
“humongously more lucrative,” ER1395), and to renegotiate existing license 
agreements so that royalty levels are not “unreasonably high.” ER1391. As an 
initial matter, these remedial measures, while serious, are not likely to put an end to 
Qualcomm’s ability to design, manufacture and sell chips to governmental and 
non-governmental customers.  
There are many suppliers of critical technologies and components to 
government agencies that do not engage in the kind of anticompetitive practices of 
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which Qualcomm has been accused. And the failure of these suppliers (i.e., 
virtually every supplier other than Qualcomm) to engage in such practices does not 
appear to have hampered their ability to supply the DOE, DOD and other agencies 
with a wide range of secure and reliable technology products. Thus, it is unclear 
why the DOD and DOE feel that the cessation of such anticompetitive practices by 
Qualcomm will materially affect its ongoing ability to supply them with modem 
chips. Certainly, no evidence to that effect has been adduced in this case. 
2. Eliminating the Barriers to Market Entry Previously 
Imposed by Qualcomm Will Likely Open the Chip Market 
to More U.S. Competitors 
The DOE expresses concern that, if the district court’s injunction is 
enforced, “the unique role played by Qualcomm in the U.S. telecommunications 
supply chain would not be filled by another U.S. entity.” ER316 ¶ 9. If 
Qualcomm’s role in the U.S. telecommunications supply chain today is ‘unique’, 
perhaps this is because, as found by the district court, Qualcomm has refused to 
license to rival modem chip suppliers. ER1395. As the district court noted, 
Qualcomm’s anticompetitive behavior “has promoted rivals’ exit from the market, 
prevented rivals’ entry, and delayed or hampered the entry and success of other 
rivals.” ER1280.The district court’s injunction requires Qualcomm to make its 
patented technology available to rival chip makers on FRAND terms, enabling 
those rivals to “enter modem chip markets without fear of an infringement action.” 
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ER1395. As such, enforcement of the district court’s injunction is likely to open 
chip markets to competitors, thereby increasing the number of domestic suppliers 
of modem chips to the government rather than reducing it.15 
3. A Hostile Foreign Government Could Not Capture 5G 
Standardization in a Manner That Would Hobble 
Qualcomm’s Ability to Develop, Manufacture and Sell 
Chips to Government Agencies 
The DOD and DOE also express concern that Chinese companies, 
particularly Huawei, will fill the void left by Qualcomm’s reduced participation in 
5G standardization, and “an aggressive, eager China will set standards to 
accommodate its own wishes.” ER323-24 ¶ 14-15. What’s more, the DOD fears 
that “cyber espionage” may result from a more competitive Huawei, “as China’s 
laws require companies to support the national security goals of China’s 
intelligence community.” Id. ¶ 15. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Huawei already leads 5G standardization by 
some measures, see Table 1, suppose, for the sake of argument, that Qualcomm’s 
compliance with the district court’s injunction were to give Huawei or another 
foreign SEP holder a further advantage in the area of 5G standardization. If that 
occurred, the foreign SEP holder would likely develop further technologies for 
                                      
15  Initial Determination, supra note 10, at *108. 
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incorporation into 5G standards and acquire additional patents covering those 
technologies.  
But the virtue of international standards is that they are open and publicly 
accessible, so that Qualcomm and other chip makers would have full access to the 
information contained in them. Moreover, to the extent that the foreign SEP 
holder’s patents covered portions of 5G standards, the foreign SEP holder would be 
required to license those SEPs to all applicants, including Qualcomm, on FRAND 
terms. Thus, Qualcomm, like every other modem chip supplier, would have access 
to the foreign company’s patents on FRAND terms, as today it has access to 
Huawei’s and many other foreign companies’ 3G and 4G SEPs. Thus, from the 
standpoint of patent access, a more influential and competitive Huawei would not 
diminish the ability of U.S. modem chip suppliers like Qualcomm to manufacture 
and sell chips conforming to 5G standards. 
Even if a foreign SEP holder were pressured by its government to violate its 
FRAND commitments and refused to license rival chip suppliers (as Qualcomm 
itself was found by the district court to have done), Qualcomm and other U.S. chip 
suppliers could still manufacture and sell 5G chips in reliance on the foreign SEP 
holder’s commitment to grant them FRAND licenses. The foreign SEP holder’s 
only recourse would then be to sue those unlicensed chip makers for patent 
infringement in the countries where they made or sold 5G chips. But the infringing 
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chip makers, including Qualcomm, would have an airtight defense: the foreign SEP 
holder remains committed to grant them FRAND licenses under the asserted SEPs.   
Thus, it is hard to find a basis for the fears expressed by the DOD and DOE 
regarding the potential loss of a key supplier of components essential to national 
security if Qualcomm is required to comply with the district court’s injunction. 
4. The United States Government and its Contractors Have 
the Right Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to Manufacture and Use 
any Patented Invention Without the Consent of the Owner 
for Governmental Purposes 
Even if a foreign firm refused to grant a patent license to Qualcomm or other 
U.S. government chip suppliers, the U.S. government could ensure the continued 
supply of chips for governmental use under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. This important 
statutory provision permits the U.S. government and its contractors to manufacture 
and sell products covered by U.S. patents so long as they are used by or for the 
federal government. The patent holder’s only recourse in such situations is to bring 
an action in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of royalties. 
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
Thus, no matter what action a hostile foreign nation or firm took with 
respect to patents covering 5G technology (whether or not such patents are SEPs), 
the U.S. government could authorize Qualcomm and other chip suppliers to 
continue to manufacture and sell such chips to the government for the national 
infrastructure and security applications that are of concern. As a result, there is no 
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reason, from a national security perspective, to excuse Qualcomm from complying 
with the terms of the district court’s injunction.  
5. Qualcomm’s Compliance with the District Court’s 
Injunction Will Not Increase a Hostile Government’s 
Ability to Incorporate Cyber Espionage or Other Malicious 
Features into 5G Standards 
The DOD worries that the increased influence of Chinese vendors such as 
Huawei on 5G standardization (filling the void left by a less profitable Qualcomm) 
would enable the Chinese government to insert malicious features such as “cyber 
espionage” capabilities into 5G standards. ER323-24 ¶ 15. This fear is unfounded.  
International SDOs typically adopt standards on the basis of consensus 
among the members of the relevant technical committee or working group, and 
then by the SDO as a whole. Justus Baron et al., Making the Rules: The 
Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on 
Intellectual Property Rights, JRC Science for Policy Report EUR 29655 at 107 
(Nikolaus Thumm ed., Mar. 2019). In some cases, formal voting or balloting 
occurs. Yet voting representation is not weighted based on the number of patents 
held or technical contributions made by a firm. Typically, one member firm, or one 
participating individual, gets one vote, though in some SDOs such as ISO, voting 
is by country/national delegation. Id. at 93. Thus, due to the careful design of SDO 
governance procedures, a single firm or country could not influence a standard to 
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include technical features that were objectionable to a significant number of other 
SDO participants.  
Accordingly, it would not be feasible for Huawei or other Chinese firms to 
introduce malicious technologies into 5G standards unless a significant number of 
other, non-Chinese firms supported the inclusion of such technology.16 
D. Qualcomm is Only One of Several Leading Firms Engaged in 5G 
Technology and Standards Development 
The DOD states, without substantiation, that Qualcomm is “currently the 
leading United States based company in the development and standard setting for 
5G technology.” ER319 ⁋ 3. It goes on to equate Qualcomm’s participation in 5G 
standards development with U.S. leadership in this area, predicting that “[w]ithout 
the voice of U.S. industry, other competitor nations could stifle standards that sup-
port innovation, competitiveness, and an open ecosystem – in favor of standards 
which would support the parochial goals of a single state-owned company.” 
ER322-23 ⁋ 12. 
Likewise the DOE worries that requiring Qualcomm to comply with the 
district court’s injunction might “allow[] foreign-aligned firms to advance and 
                                      
16 This is not to say, of course, that foreign firms could not incorporate such 
malicious technologies into 5G products. But products are a different matter than 
standards. If the U.S. government is concerned with potential malicious code 
contained within foreign-made products, then it may refrain from purchasing those 
products, as it has done in the past.  
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drive the development and intellectual property underpinnings of international 5G 
standards instead of the U.S.” ER316. 
Notwithstanding conclusory statements such as these, Qualcomm is not the 
global leader in 5G standards or technology development, nor does the U.S. lead in 
this technology sector. According to one study, as of July 2019 the firms declaring 
the most patents as essential to international 5G standards were the following: 
Table 117 
Ranking Firm Country 5G Declared 
Patent Families 
1 Huawei China 2,160 
2 Nokia/Alcatel Finland/France 1,516 
3 ZTE China 1,424 
4 LG Korea 1,359 
5 Samsung Korea 1,353 
6 Ericsson Sweden 1,058 
7 Qualcomm U.S.A. 921 
8 Sharp Japan 660 
9 Intel U.S.A. 618 
 
Another analysis, which sought to weigh patent ownership based on the 
essentiality of patents to 5G standards, produced the following rankings: 
                                      
17 Adapted by the author from IPLytics, Who is leading the 5G patent race? A 
patent landscape analysis on declared SEPs and standards contributions, Intell. 
Asset Mgmt. at 6, tbl. 2 (July 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/who-leading-5g-
patent-race-0. 
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1 Ericsson Sweden 15.8% 
2 Samsung Korea 14.1% 
3 Qualcomm U.S.A. 12.6% 
4 Nokia/Alcatel Finland/France 10.9% 
4 Huawei China 10.9% 
6 LG Korea 8.8% 
7 ZTE China 8.6% 
8 Intel U.S.A. 6.8% 
9 Sharp Japan 5.4% 
 
As both of these tables show, Qualcomm, while a significant participant in 
5G technology development and standardization, is only one of many leading firms 
engaged in this collaborative international activity. If the DOJ, DOD and DOE fear 
non-U.S. dominance of 5G technology, then their fears have already been realized. 
Only two U.S. firms (Qualcomm and Intel) appear in the top nine players in this 
technology sector, as do two Chinese firms, two Korean firms, two European firms 
and one Japanese firm.  
Given the existing international character of 5G standards development, and 
the fact that a large majority of patents and standards covering emerging 5G 
technology are already in foreign hands, it is difficult to understand why DOJ, 
                                      
18 Adapted by the author from Matthew Noble et al., Determining which companies 
are leading the 5G race, Intellectual Asset Mgmt., July/Aug. 2019, at p. 36, fig. 1. 
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DOD and DOE believe that enjoining Qualcomm from pursuing anticompetitive 
business practices will significantly weaken the U.S. position in this technology 
area. The U.S. does not have a “dominant” position in 5G now, nor is the 
preservation of Qualcomm’s current profitability level likely to give it one. 
Thus, if there is a risk that a hostile foreign nation will seek to disadvantage 
the U.S. through the exertion of control over 5G patents and standards, that risk 
already exists today, and allowing Qualcomm to continue to engage in 
anticompetitive activity is not likely to alleviate that risk in the future. But even 
without the ability to charge monopoly rents, Qualcomm is likely to remain a 
significant 5G contributor. And if it were to drop a place or two in the list of 
contributors, such a decline would hardly have a significant effect on national 
security.  
In short, while DOD and DOE might prefer that the U.S. dominate 5G 
technology and standard-setting, 5G standardization today is truly an international 
activity dominated by no individual nation. Releasing Qualcomm from the district 
court’s injunction is unlikely to change this reality. And, more importantly, 
reducing the penalty for anticompetitive conduct solely to bolster a local 
champion’s domestic market and profitability smacks of the sort of “parochial,” 
protectionist behavior that the United States routinely, and justifiably, condemns 
when it occurs abroad.  
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court’s 
judgment and injunction. 
 
Dated: November 26, 2019 Respectfully submitted, 
 
KESSELMAN BRANTLY STOCKINGER LLP 
 
By: /s/ David W. Kesselman     
          DAVID W. KESSELMAN 
          AMY T. BRANTLY 
          MONICA M. CASTILLO VAN PANHUYS 
 
          Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
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